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RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - Ex POST FACTO LAWS - LOYALTY OATHS. - The
petitioners, prospective candidates for governor, Congress, and the state legis-
lature, sought a declaratory judgement that the Washington statute 1 requir-
ing candidates for public office to swear that they are not subversives is un-
'constitutional. Stating that they would be precluded from candidacy because
they could not or would not execute the required loyalty oath, the petitioners
attacked the statute aq being -x post facto in effect and a bill of attainder
by nature. They claimed that the statute imposed disqualification for public
office'as punishment for acts not illegal at the time of their commission. The
Washington court held that the statute required an oath of allegiance in a
present and prospective sense and therefore was neither an ex post facto law
nor a bill of attainder. Huntamer v. Coe, 246 P.2d 489 (Wash. 1952).
During the American Civil War, and ltter in the reconstruction period.
several states enacted statutes and wrote provisions into their constitutions.
requiring an oath of past loyalty as a qualification for voting, running for
office, or pursuing specified occupations. These enactments were designed
to exclude the adherents of the Confederacy from the designated activities.
More recently, the legislatures and courts have been concerned with the acti-
vities of subversive groups and individuals. -
In a leading case,3 the Supreme Court of the United States invalidated a
provision in the Missouri constitution 4 that required a past loyalty oath 5 as
a prerequisite to the following of a private avocation. 6 The court made it
clear that qualifications having no relation to the fitness of the party to carry
on the pursuit constituted punishment,7 and were in the nature of ex post
1. Wash. Laws 1951 c. 254 §116: "A candidate for any public office . . . shall
file an affidavit that he or she is not a subversive person as defined in this act."
Wash. Laws 1951, c. 254 §1 (e): "'Subversive person' means any person who com-
suits, attempts to commit, or aids in the commission, or advocates, abets, advises or
teaches . . . any act intended to overthrow, destroy or alter . . . the constitutional
form of the government of the. United States, or the State of Washington, or any
political subdivision of either of them, by revolution, force, or violence; or who is a
member of a subversive organization or a foreign subversive organization."
2. For historical discussion of loyalty oaths see Note 18 A.L.R. (2d) 268 (1951).
3. Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277 (U.S. 1867).
4. Id. at 279. "See 3. "No person shall be deemed a qualified voter, who has
ever been in armed hostility to the United States . . .. or . . . this state; or has ever
given . . . support to . . . such . . . hostility . . . nor shall any such person be
capable of holding . . . any office of honor, trust, or profit . . . or acting as a profes-
sor or teacher .. ." "See. 6. The Oath of Loyalty . . . shall be in the following terms:
'I . . . do solemnly swear that I am well acquainted with the terms of the third
section . . . of the Constitution . . . and have carefully considered the same; that
I have never, directly or indirectly, done any of the acts specified. . . . Sec. 9 . . .
'nor shall any person be competent . . . to teach or preach . . . unless such person
shall have first taken . . . said oath'." Sec. 14. Provided fine and imprisonment
for those who did not file the oath.
5. Black's Law Dictionary 1643 (4th ed. 1951): "Test Oath. An oath required
to be taken as a criterion of of the fitness of the person to fill a public or political
office; but particularly an oath of fidelity and allegiance (past or present) to the
established government."
6. Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277 (U.S. 1867). Reverend Cummings, a
Catholic priest, was convicted of teaching and preaching without having first taken
the oath. The conviction was reversed.
7. Id. at 320. "The deprivation of any rights, civil or political, previously
enjoyed, may be punishment, the circumstances attending and the causes of the depri-
vation determining this fact."
BECENT CASES
facto8 laws and bills of attainder." All men have the inalienable right to fol-
low the pursuit of their choice,10 and legislative decrees of exclusion that in-
flict a penalty abridge this right." The constitutional prohibitions of ex post
facto laws 12 are aimed at criminal punishment,"a and neither the states nor
Congress can avoid this prohibition by giving the penalty a civil form."
However, it is established that state legislatures have the power to regulate
occupations, 15 and may use past conduct as a standard if the statute repre-
sents a genuine attempt to determine the fitness of a party to engage in the
specified calling.' 6 This extension of legislative authority has not met unani-
mious judicial approval,"7 but a federal statute of the same nature has been
,pheld.1'
State decisions have held that a test oath that was ex post facto in rela-
tion to private callings was not ex post facto in relation to public officers and
voters."' These state decisions seem to be based on a distinction between
natural rights and granted privileges. While doing the work of one's choice
is a natural right,20 holding office or voting is a privilege granted by duly
constituted authority, and such authority may set the standards for conferring
or withdrawing the privilege.2 In determining the standard a state may use
past conduct as a measure of present fitness, so long as the circumstances in-
dicate a reasonable relationship between the past action and present quali-
fications.'2
To date, the Supreme Court of the United States has not decided whether
8. For definition see note 13 infra.
9. Cummingq v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 323, (U.S. 1867). 'A bill of attainer
is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without a judicial trial."
10. Id. at 321.
11. Ex Parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333 (U.S. 1867).
12. U.S. Const. Art. I, §9 (3), §l0 (1).
13. Calder v. Bull, 3 DalI. 385, 390 (U.S. 1798). Defined ex post facto
laws: "Ist. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and
which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2d. Every law
that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3d. Every
law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law
,annexed to the crime, when comnitted. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules
of evidence, and receives less, or different testimony, than the law required at the
time of the commision of the offense.... ." Cf. Harrisades v. Shaughnessy, 342
U.S. 580, 593 (1952) (deportation not subject to ex post facto obeetion).
14. See Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 325 (U.S. 1867) (trial by jury not
subject to indirect legislative abrogation).
15. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889) (practice of medicine).
16. Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898) (past felony may be conclu-
sive evidence of present unfitness where moral character is essential to professioial
competence).
17. Id. at 203, 204 (dissent considered disqualification punishment inconsistent
with Cummings v. Missouri, see note 3 supra).
18. Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319
U.S. 770 (1943).
19. Compare State v. Woodson, 41 Mo. 228 (1867) (public officer removed
for not filing oath), and Blair v. Ridgley, 41 Mo. 63 (1867) (denied vote), with Cum-
mings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277 (U.S. 1867).
20. Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 321 (U.S. 1867) "All men have certain
inalienable rights . . . among these . . . the pursuit of happiness . . . in the pursuit
of happiness all avocations, all honors, all positions are alike open to everyone ...
Any deprivations or suspension of any of these rights for past conduct is punish-
ment .. ." See Blair v. Bidgely, 41 Mo. 63, 172 (1867) (natural rights: 1. personal
seeurity, 2. personal liberty, 3. the right to acquire property, 4. in America freedom
of religion).
21. See Breedlove v. Suttles, .302 U.S. 277, 283 (1937) (voting is a state granted
privilege, except as restrained by the U.S. Constitution, states may qualify voting).
22. See Garner v. Los Angeles Board, 341 U.S. 716, 720 (1951).
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past activity in a disloyal group bears a reasonable relationship to present
fitness for public office. If the court finds the relationship reasonable, past
loyalty oath statutes are valid as merely setting a standard. But if no reason-
able relationship is found, depriving a man of public office for past activity
in disloyal groups is punishment, and renders the statutes void as ex post
facto laws and bills of attainder.
ROBERT M. FAIR
INSURANCE - CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS - DIRECT
ACTIONS AGAINST INSURANCE COIIPANIES. - A, a resident of Texas, was in-
jured in an automobile accident in Louisiana through the negligence of B,
also a resident of Texas. A brought suit directly against B's insurance com-
pany, a Swiss corporation which had entered the insurance contract with B
in Texas. In similar situations Texas permits no direct action against an in-
surance company, but a Louisiana statute allows a direct action if the acci-
dent occurs in Louisiana, even though the policy may contain a provision
forbidding such action.1 The court held that the Louisiana statute could not
be applied to contracts consummated outside the state, without giving it
extra-territorial effect and depriving the insurer of its property without due
process of law. Mayo v. Zurich General Accident & Liability Ins. Co., 106 F.
Supp. 579 (W.D. La. 1952).
Statutory attempts to deal with the problem of compensation for auto-
mobile accident victims have taken three main forms: (1) the enactment
of "Financial Responsibility Acts;" 2 (2) compulsory insurance require-
snents; 3 and (3) statutes permitting direct actions against insurers.4 The
1. La. Acts 1950, No. 541. "No policy or contract of liability insurance shall
be issued "or delivered in this state, unless it contains provisions to the effect that the
insolvency or bankruptcy of the insured, shall not release the insurer from the payment
of damages for injuries sustained or loss occasioned during the existence of the policy,
and any judgment . . . against the insured for which the insurer is liable . . . shall be
deemed prima facie evidence of the insolvency of the insured, and an action may
thereafter he maintained . . . against the insurer. The injured person . . . shall
have a right of direct action against the insurer . . . in the parish where the accident
oi injury occurred or in the parish where the insured has his domicile, and said
action may be brought against the insurer alone or against both the insured and the
insurer. . . . This right of direct action shall exist whether the policy of insurance
sued upon was written or delivered in the State of Louisiana or not and whether
or not such policy contains a provision forbidding such direct action, provided the
accident or injury occurred within the State of Louisiana .. "
2. Such laws usually contain provisions: (1) Requiring proof of financial respon-
sibility following a conviction of violation of certain motor vehicle laws. (2) Requiring
proof of financial responsibility following non-payment of a motor vehicle accident
judgment. (3) Suspending the right to operate a motor vehicle until satisfaction of
such judgment. Braun, The Financial Responsibility Law, 3 Law & Contemp. Prob.
505 (1936).
3. Massachusetts, first in this field provided in 1925, that no motor vehicle or
trailer could be registered unless an insurance company authorized to do business in
the state certified that a liability insurance policy had been issued covering the vehicle
in question. Braun, supra note 2, at 537. While compulsory insurance for all vehicles
is a rarity, many states require it for common carriers. N.D. Rev. Code 149-183.
(1943). The Statute expressly forbids joinder of the insurer in the action so as to expose
the fact of insurance to the jury. However, James v. Young, 77 N.D. 451, 43 N.W.2d
692, allowed such joinder under other statutes; cf. N.D. Rev. Code 328-0206 and
§28-0703 (1943).
4.. What Louisiana did by legislation other states have done by judicial inter-
pertation. Kansas treats an automobile liability policy as a third party beneficiary
contract creating a direct right against the insurer where the insured is a motor carrier;
